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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CALIFORNIA CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 1193 AND 1183.1(b)
IN LIGHT OF HALSPAR, INC. V. LA BARTILE
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1183.1(b) requires
that if a property owner intends to prevent a mechanics' lien from being
levied against his property interest for work performed on that property
at the instance of some third person, he must post a notice of nonrespon-
sibility within 10 days after he receives knowledge that such work is
being performed. On the other hand, Code of Civil Procedure section
1193 requires all lien claimants, except those under direct contract with
the property owner or those performing labor for wages on the premises,
to serve a preliminary notice' on the property owner within 20 days after
commencement of work on or furnishing of materials to such property.
This article will examine the interrelation between these two code sec-
tions in light of the decision rendered in Halspar, Inc. v. La Barthe
2
where both the lien claimant and the property owner failed to comply
with the above-mentioned statutory provisions.
History of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1193
Code of Civil Procedure section 1193 was added to the California
mechanics' lien laws in 1959. Marsh, in his work on the California
mechanics' lien laws, describes the situation which led up to its enact-
ment as follows:
For many years prior to the enactment of C.C.P. 1193 in
1959, there was agitation for some statute to protect property own-
ers from sudden recordation of mechanics' liens without prior
notice; and of course, the need for and the purpose of such provision
is understandable.
In many instances, the owner has held back from the con-
tractor sufficient funds to satisfy the claims of subcontractors and
materialmen; or he might be perfectly willing and able to assume
the responsibility for payment of claims in excess of his contract,
in preference to suffering the lien. Again, and it happens fre-
quently, the owner has provided his contractor with specific funds
for payment of subcontractors, but the contractor has failed to keep
his word and has used the owner's money elsewhere. The owner
1. The term "preliminary notice" will be used to describe the notice required
by section 1193 after its amendment in 1967. Prior to that time the notice require-
ment will be referred to as a "prelien notice."
2. 238 Cal. App. 2d 897, 48 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1965).
3. Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 2034, § 1, at 4677.
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innocently believes that all just claims have been paid; neverthe-
less his property is subjected to valid liens which he had no oppor-
tunity to anticipate or prevent, and he has to pay twice. Without
express notice, the owner might find himself charged with con-
structive notice for months as to liens of which he could have had
no knowledge, filed by claimants whose names he had never seen
or heard.4
For the purposes of this paper the pertinent portions of section
1193 as enacted in 1959 are as follows:
a) Except one under direct contract with the owner or one per-
forming actual labor for wages, every person who furnishes labor,
service, equipment or material for which a lien otherwise can be
claimed under this chapter, must, as a necessary prerequisite to the
validity of any claim of lien subsequently filed, cause to be given
not later than 15 days prior to the filing of a claim of lien a written
notice as prescribed by this section, to the owner or reputed owner
and to the original contractor. The notice shall contain a general
description of the labor, service, equipment or materials furnished,
the name and address of such persons furnishing such labor, serv-
ices, equipment or materials. . . . If an invoice for such materials
contains this information, a copy of such invoice, transmitted in the
manner prescribed by this section, shall be sufficient notice. The
notice may be sent at any time after any labor, services, equip-
ment or materials are furnished, but in no event later than fifteen
(15) days prior to the expiration of the time within which to file a
claim of lien.5
In 1965 changes were made, but they dealt solely with the method
of serving a prelien notice, and are not relevant here.0
In 1967, section 1193 was completely rewritten;7 the material
changes follow.
(1) It requires that a preliminary notice be given 20 days after
commencement of construction' in place of the old rule which allowed
such notice to be given 15 or more days prior to filing the actual claim
of lien.'
(2) In conjunction with the above change, the new section pro-
vides that a preliminary notice may be served and a lien perfected at
any time after commencement of construction, but the lien claimant will
not be entitled to a lien for any work performed or materials supplied
prior to the 20 days immediately preceeding the service of such notice.10
4. M. MARsH, CAL.FORNI MEcaANIcS' LIEN HANBooK § 4.1, at 23 (1965).
5. Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 2034, § 1, at 4677.
6. Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1258, § 1, at 3131.
7. Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 789, § 2, at 2183. It should also be noted that
similar revisions were made with respect to CAL. GOv'T CODE § 4210, the public
works equivalent of CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1193.
8. Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 789, § 2, at 2183.
9. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
10. Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 789, § 2, at 2184,
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(3) The new section requires additional information to be in-
cluded in the preliminary notice. The old prelien notice was re-
quired to contain the following information:
(a) A general description of the labor or material supplied;
(b) The name and address of the person supplying the above;
(c) The name of the person who contracted for such labor or
materials."
In addition to the above, the 1967 amendment requires the follow-
ing information:
(a) A description of the job site sufficient for identification;
2
(b) a statement that if bills are not paid in full for labor, materials,
etc., furnished or to be furnished, the improved property may be subject
to a lien.'8
Legislative Purpose Behind the Current Section 1193
Before examining what was intended by the 1967 amendment to
section 1193, one should look at the basic scheme upon which Cali-
fornia's mechanics' lien laws are based.
In Diamond Match Co. v. Sanitary Fruit Co.,' 4 the court noted:
[I]t is no less the duty of the legislature in adopting means for the
enforcement of the liens referred to in the constitutional provision,
to consider and protect the rights of owners of property which may
be affected by such liens than it is to consider and protect the
rights of those claiming the benefit of the lien laws.' 5
To the same effect the court stated in Alta Building Material Co. v.
Cameron' 6
While the essential purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes is
to protect those who have performed labor or furnished material
11. Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 2034, § 1, at 4677.
12. Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 789, § 2, at 2184.
13. Id. Additional amendments were made to section 1193 in 1968, but are not
relevant to this article. See Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 460, § 4, at 1090. It should be
noted at this time that Senate Bill 316 (1969) has been passed by both houses of the
state legislature and has been signed by the Governor of California. Under the terms
of the bill, effective January 1, 1971, the entire body of California mechanics' lien
laws will be removed from the Code of Civil Procedure and restated in the Civil Code.
In regard to the provisions of the current Code of Civil Procedure section 1193, see
pending Civil Code sections 3097 and 3114. In regard to the current provisions of
Code of Civil Procedure section 1183.1(b), see pending Civil Code sections 3094 and
3129.
The legislative purpose of Senate Bill 316 (1969) is not to alter, but merely to
restate and clarify. SB 316, § 10 (1969).
14. 70 Cal. App. 695, 234 P. 322 (1925).
15. Id. at 701, 234 P. at 325. This language is quoted with approval in Borchers
Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 59 Cal. 2d 234, 239, 379 P.2d 1, 4, 28 Cal. Rptr. 697,
699 (1963).
16. 202 Cal. App. 2d 299, 20 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1962).
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towards the improvement of the property of another, inherent in
this concept is a recognition also of the rights of the owner of the
benefited property. 17
The court went on to say that section 1193 should be viewed within
the framework of those principles.
18
There are no cases that have specifically dealt with section 1193
since it was rewritten in 1967. Therefore, in order to properly ascertain
the intent behind that section, it will be necessary to examine the cases
dealing with the statute as it was originally drafted in 1959, and then
by analogy, to extend those decisions to the section as it currently
reads.1
9
It has been said that the primary purpose of section 1193 is to pro-
vide notice to a property owner 0 that his property may be subjected to a
Hen arising out of a contract to which he was not a party and to give
him sufficient time to prevent the filing of such lien.2' Collaterally,
the statute protects a property owner against double payment of ma-
terial and construction costs,22 provides him an opportunity to deter-
mine the validity of the pending lien claim,28 enables him to avoid
costly work stoppages, mechanics' lien foreclosure sales, and in general
gives increased financial security to the building industry.24 The clear-
est statement of purpose is that contained in Alta Building Material Co.
v. Cameron:
25
The section does not require a pre-lien notice by those under
direct contract with the owner or those who perform actual labor for
17. Id. at 303-04, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 304, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
19. There exist analogous provisions to section 1193 in both the California
Public Works Law, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4200 et seq., and the Federal Miller Act,
40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(d) (1964), but the cases construing those laws unfortunately
shed little, if any, light on the purpose behind the section with which we are dealing.
See also the proceedings of the Senate Judiciary Committee found in Fifth Progress
Report to the Legislature by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1957-59, Mechanics,
Liens, 1960 APPENDIX TO rnM JOURNAL OF T=E CALIFORNU SENATE at 17.
20. Notice is also required to be given the general contractor and the con-
struction lender. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1193(a).
21. H. & L. Supply, Inc. v. Ewing, 253 Cal. App. 2d 283, 61 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1967); Halspar, Inc. v. La Barthe, 238 Cal. App. 2d 897, 48 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1965);
Wand Corp. v. San Gabriel Valley Lumber Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 855, 46 Cal. Rptr.
486 (1965); Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 62,
25 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1962); Alta Bldg. Material Co. v. Cameron, 202 Cal. App. 2d 299,
20 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1962); 51 OPs. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 65, 69 (1968); 35 OPs. CAL.
ATr'Y GEN. 136, 139 (1960).
22. Wand Corp. v. San Gabriel Valley Lumber Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 855, 46
Cal. Rptr. 486 (1965); 51 Ops. CAL. ATTrY GEN. 65, 69 (1968).
23. Wand Corp. v. San Gabriel Valley Lumber Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 855, 46
Cal. Rptr. 486 (1965).
24. 51 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 65, 69 (1968).
25. 202 Cal. App. 2d 299, 20 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1962).
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wages on the property. The logical reason for this distinction is
that the owner would in the usual situation be apprised of potential
claims by way of lien in connection with those with whom he con-
tracts directly, as well as those who perform actual labor for wages
upon the property.
However, as to materials furnished or labor supplied by per-
sons not under direct contract with the owner, it may be difficult,
if not impossible, for the owner to be so apprised and the clear
purpose of section 1193 is to give the owner 15 days' notice in such
a situation that his property is to be "embarrassed with a charge
which will operate as a cloud upon the title thereof so long as the
lien remains undischarged and that the property may be sold under
foreclosure proceedings unless the debt to secure which the lien
was filed is otherwise sooner satisfied."
26
As mentioned above,2 7 the most substantial change to section 1193
in the 1967 amendment was that which changed the required deadline
for serving a prelien notice from 15 days prior to filing a claim of lien
to 20 days after commencement of the work for which a lien is to be
claimed. Possibly it would have been better had the legislature re-
quired such notice to be given prior to the commencement of work or
delivery of materials. Such a requirement would give the property
owner an opportunity to prevent unauthorized work from being per-
formed, and in addition, would allow a lien claimant to learn before
he expends his effort on the property that he will have to look to the
lessee or vendee, etc. (in cases where work was authorized by someone
other than the property owner) as his sole source of payment. Re-
quiring notice to be given prior to commencement of work or delivery
of materials, however, could cause undue delays in the construction
process. As written, section 1193 allows the lien claimant 20 days
to determine who the property owner, construction lender, and general
contractor are, and to serve the required notices without delaying con-
struction. An analysis of section 1193, as now written, shows that the
code section is designed to give notice as early as reasonably possible
to those persons whose property interests may be adversely affected by
a mechanics' lien, and who would not ordinarily be apprised that labor
or materials from which such lien arises are being furnished. It would
thus seem that the changes made in 1967 did not substantially affect
the basic purposes behind the original section, but rather, were de-
signed to implement the original legislative intentions.
28
Extent of the "Except For" Provision in Section 1193
In 1959, when section 1193 was enacted, it specifically exempted
two classes of lien claimants from the requirements of serving a prelien
26. Id. at 304, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (citations omitted).
27. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
28. See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
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notice-those under direct contract with the property owner, and those
performing actual labor for wages upon the property.29 The rationale
behind these exceptions is that in the normal situation the property
owner, if he were a direct party to the contract, would be apprised of
potential lien claims arising out of the contract. 0 That reasoning, how-
ever, would not necessarily follow when applied to one performing
labor for wages upon the property, especially where the lessee con-
tracts for the work to be done. The rationale behind exempting those
laboring for wages upon the property, while not clear, seems based, in
part, on the idea that an "uninformed laborer would not, as a practical
matter, have the same opportunity to comply with a notice requirement
as a material supplier would." 31 The legislature's concern for the poorly
educated laborer may be well intentioned; nevertheless, it would super-
ficially appear to be in conflict with California Constitution article 20,
section 1532 which provides that:
Mechanics, materialmen, artisans, and laborers of every class,
shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have be-
stowed labor or furnished material for the value of such labor
done and material furnished; and the Legislature shall provide,
by law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens.
3 3
When first presented with a case under section 1193, a California
court declared that these exceptions were unconstitutional because they
unfairly discriminated between various classes of lien claimants in vio-
lation of article 20, section 15 of the California Constitution. 34 In
1962, however, the California Court of Appeal reviewed those earlier
opinions and, in effect, reversed them. 5 The court held that section
29. Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1258, § 1, at 3132. "For the limited purpose of the
notice requirement contained therein, section 1193 creates two classes of lien claimants,
(1) those who are either 'under direct contract with the owner' or 'performing actual
labor for wages' and (2) all others." Alta Bldg. Material Co. v. Cameron, 202 Cal.
App. 2d 299, 303, 20 Cal. Rptr. 713, 715 (1962).
30. Id. at 304, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
31. Borchers Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 59 Cal. 2d 234, 240, 379 P.2d 1, 4,
28 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
32. Letter from Ralph N. Kelps, legislative counsel, to Hon. Thomas J. Mac-
Bride, May 1, 1958, reprinted in Fifth Progress Report to the Legislature by the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 1957-59, Mechanics' Liens, 1960 APPENDix TO THE
JouRNAL OF THE CALiFORN A SENATE at 65-67 (questioning the constitutionality of
excepting laborers from proposed section 1193).
33. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 15. See, e.g., Miltimore v. Nofziger Bros. Lumber Co.,
150 Cal. 790, 90 P. 114 (1907); Stimson Mill Co. v. Nolan, 5 Cal. App. 754, 91 P. 262
(1907); Reliable Steel Supply Co. v. Croom, 181 Cal. App. 2d 831, 5 Cal. Rptr. 310
(Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1960).
34. Reliable Steel Supply Co. v. Croom, 181 Cal. App. 2d 831, 5 Cal. Rptr. 310
(Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1960); accord, Hellen v. Stephenson, 197 Cal. App. 2d 863, 18
Cal. Rptr. 361 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1961) (declaring subdivision (a) unconstitutional
on the basis of Reliable).
35. Alta Bldg. Material Co. v. Cameron, 202 Cal. App. 2d 299, 20 Cal. Rptr.
713 (1962).
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1193 affected "only the manner in which the right is to be enforced.
The right itself is not denied or impaired." 36  The decision was rein-
forced by another case in 1963"7 and apparently the issue has been
permanently settled. The legislative classifications set out in section
1193 have been judicially determined to be neither arbitrary nor un-
reasonable, and hence, the notice requirement is constitutional.
3 8
We are still faced, however, with the question of what lien claim-
ants are encompassed by the exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of
section 1193.
"One Under Direct Contract with the Owner"
The courts have apparently interpreted this provision literally,
holding that it encompasses only those persons who have a direct
contractual relationship with the property owner or his agent.39 The
reason given for such an interpretation is that if the owner has been a
party to the contract he would, in the usual situation, be aware of the
information otherwise required to be given by a prelien notice.40 It
would seem clear, therefore, that a contractor who performs a work of
improvement at the request of a lessee does not have "a direct contract
with the owner," as that phrase is used in section 1193(a). This con-
clusion is buttressed by decisions in at least two cases4 where the
court has found it necessary to apply the doctrine of estoppel in order
to bring within the scope of the "direct contract" exception in section
1193 a lien claimant who had contracted with a property owner's
lessee. Discussions of those cases will be postponed until a later section
of this article.4 2
"One Performing Actual Labor for Wages"
The rationale applied to the "direct contract" exception has been
likewise applied here,43 even though performance of labor on the prop-
36. Id. at 303, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
37. Borchers Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 59 Cal. 2d 234, 379 P.2d 1, 28
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
38. Id. at 240, 379 P.2d at 4, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
39. See, e.g., Alta Bldg. Material Co. v. Cameron, 202 Cal. App. 2d 299, 304,
20 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1962); Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 209
Cal. App. 2d 62, 68, 25 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (1962).
40. Duncanson-Harrelson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 62, 67,
25 Cal. Rptr. 718, 721-22 (1962); 35 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 136 (1960).
41. Benson Elec. Co. v. Hale Bros. Ass'n, 246 Cal. App. 2d 686, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1966); Halspar, Inc. v. La Barthe, 238 Cal. App. 2d 897, 48 Cal. Rptr. 293
(1965).
42. See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
43. Alta Bldg. Material Co. v. Cameron, 202 Cal. App. 2d 299, 304, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 713, 716 (1962); Duncanson-Harrelson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 209 Cal. App.
2d 62, 68, 25 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (1962).
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erty would not necessarily give a property owner notice of potential
lien claims-especially where the actual labor is being performed on
leased property. An additional reason for this exception was indicated
in Borchers Brothers v. Buckeye Incubator Co."4 where the court seemed
to say that a common laborer would not have the same opportunity, or
requisite knowledge, as possessed by other types of lien claimants, to
comply with the notice requirements of section 1193. 45
The only case specifically dealing with the scope of the phrase
"actual labor for wages" within the meaning of section 1193 is Borello
v. Eichler Homes, Inc.46  In its decision, the court applied the same
tests applied to cases dealing with the question whether one is a con-
tractor or an employee within the meaning of the contractors' licens-
ing law.47  The two standards set down in the Borello case require:
1) that sole compensation be in the form of hourly wages; and 2) that
there is a lack of discretion in how such labor is to be performed.48
The facts in the Borello case showed that plaintiffs were hired to perform
certain excavating and grading work in return for an hourly rate of com-
pensation that included both the rental cost of the necessary equipment
and the wages of the operators. Plaintiffs were under the supervision
of the employing contractor's foreman and had no discretion in the
performance of their work. On the basis of those facts the court deter-
mined that plaintiffs were within the exception to section 1193(a) and
hence not required to file the then 15 day prelien notice.
49
In the opinion of this writer, it is a mistake for a court to endeavor
to lay down a firm set of rules for determining who is performing
"actual labor for wages." Each case should be examined individ-
ually, with an eye toward the underlying purpose behind section 1193.
The rules laid down in Borello should be viewed only as guidelines,
and should not be applied as rigid standards.
Interplay Between Section 1183.1 and Section 1193
For orientation purposes, a brief introduction to the "notice of
responsibility" section of Code of Civil Procedure section 1183.1 (b) 5 °
44. 59 Cal. 2d 234, 379 P.2d 1, 28 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
45. See id. at 240, 379 P.2d at 4, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
46. 221 Cal. App. 2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1963).
47. See id. at 498, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56. The code sections in question are
CAL.. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7000-7145. See particularly sections 7026, 7031, and 7053.
48. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 498-99, 34 Cal. Rptr. 655-56 (1963).
49. Id. at 499, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 655. See generally Rodoni v. Harbor Eng'rs,
191 Cal. App. 2d 560, 12 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1961); Denton v. Wiese, 144 Cal. App. 2d
175, 177-80, 300 P.2d 746, 748-49 (1956); Andrew v. Conner, 101 Cal. App. 2d
621, 622-23, 225 P.2d 943, 944 (1951); Frugoli v. Conway, 95 Cal. App. 2d 518,
519-20, 213 P.2d 76, 77 (1950).
50. Formerly Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1192, Cal. Stats. 1925, ch. 155, § 1, at 304.
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is necessary before proceeding with an analysis of those cases which in-
volved section 1183.1(b) and section 1193. The pertinent part of
section 1183. 1(b) reads as follows:
(b) Every building or other improvement or work mentioned
in this chapter. . . constructed, altered or repaired upon any land
with the knowledge of the owner . . . , shall be held to have
been constructed, performed or furnished at the instance of such
owner, . . . and such interest owned . . . shall be subject to any
lien filed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless
such owner. . . shall, within 10 days after he shall have obtained
knowledge of such construction, alteration or repair or work or
labor, give notice that he will not be responsible for the same by
posting a notice in writing to that effect in some conspicuous place
upon the property, and shall also, ... file for record a verified
copy of said notice in the office of the county recorder of the
said county in which said property . . . is situated. Said notice
shall contain a description of the property affected thereby suffi-
cient for identification, with the name and the nature of the title
or interest of the person giving the same, name of purchaser under
contract, if any, or lessee if known. .... 51
This section is intended to cover situations where someone holding less
than a fee title to property, such as a lessee or conditional purchaser,
enters into a contract for the improvement thereof without the knowl-
edge of the owner.5" The purpose behind the section is two-fold: (1)
to give such a property owner an opportunity to prevent a mechanics'
lien from attaching to his property interest once he obtains knowledge
that such work is being performed, and (2) to bring notice home to
those who are expending labor or materials upon such property that
the owner's interest in that property will not be liable for such labor
or materials.G3  As stated above, it is primarily the purpose of this
paper to determine the relationship of this section to section 1193, as
amended in 1967.
It has been held that the basis of section 1183.1(b) is the doctrine
of estoppel. The owner of real property having knowingly procured,
by the act of another, the improvement of such property, and received
the benefit of another's labor and/or materials thereby, is deemed to
have created an equitable lien upon the premises to secure payment
of the value of such labor and materials.54
51. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1183.1(b) (emphasis added).
52. Frank Curran Lumber Co. v. Eleven Co., 271 A.C.A. 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1969).
53. Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Ford, 64 Cal. App. 2d 346, 148 P.2d 689
(1944).
54. Nolte v. Smith, 189 Cal. App. 2d 140, 144, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1961);
see John R. Gentle & Co. v. Britton, 158 Cal. 328, 332, 111 P. 9, 11 (1910) (referring to
old section 1192 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
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Haispar and Subsequent Cases
Beginning in 1965, three cases with similar factual situations were
decided by the California courts.55 In each case there was a noncon-
tracting property owner, with knowledge of the work being performed
on his property, who failed to post a notice of nonresponsibility as al-
lowed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1183.1(b), and
a contractor lien-claimant who failed to serve the property owner with
the 15 day prelien notice as required by Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1193 (as it read prior to November, 1967).
In the first of these cases, Halspar, Inc. v. La Barthe,5 6 the plaintiff
lien claimant, a general contractor, had contracted with the lessee of
property owned by the defendants to construct certain improvements
on the property. The total cost of the improvements was approximately
$30,000, of which only half had been paid by the lessee before an in-
voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the lessee. The work
in question was completed on January 22, 1962, and a lien for the un-
paid amount of the contract price was filed by plaintiff, Halspar, on
April 6, 1962, well within the required time limitation for the filing
of mechanics' lien claims."7 At no time, however, had Halspar given
the defendants a prelien notice as required by section 1193. The facts
did show, though, that the defendants were aware of the work being
performed, and had failed to post the notice of nonresponsibility as
allowed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1183.1 (b).
The court held that defendants were, in effect, under a "direct
contract" with the lien claimant because of their failure to post a notice
of nonresponsibility, 8 and therefore, Halspar, the lien claimant, was
within one of the express exceptions to section 1193 and consequently
under no duty to serve a 15 day prelien notice on the defendants. 9
The court spoke in terms of applying a "conclusive presumption" that
the work was done at the instance and request of the property owners.6 0
This phrase "conclusive presumption" was borrowed from the early
case of Krenwinkel v. Henne,6" where it was stated:
55. Scott, Blake and Wynne v. Summit Ridge Estates, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
347, 59 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1967); Benson Elec. Co. v. Hale Bros. Ass'n Inc., 246 Cal.
App. 2d 686, 55 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1966); Halspar, Inc. v. La Barthe, 238 Cal. App. 2d
897, 48 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1965). For an earlier case dealing with similar facts prior
to the enactment of section 1193 see Dixon v. Fredericks, 129 Cal. App. 703, 19 P.2d
272 (1933).
56. 238 Cal. App. 2d 897, 48 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1965).
57. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. § 1193.1(c).
58. Accord, Dixon v. Fredericks, 129 Cal. App. 703, 19 P.2d 272 (1933);
Coombs v. Green Mill, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 204, 290 P. 620 (1930).
59. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 899-900, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
60. Id. at 899, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
61. 42 Cal. App. 580, 183 P. 957 (1919).
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Section 1192 [which has since been repealed, but which served
substantially as the basis for the current section 1183.1(b)] 62 . . .
places the noncontracting owner in the position of a party to the
contract, in that it creates a conclusive presumption that the work
was done at his instance and request [if he fails to file a notice of
nonresponsibility once he has knowledge that work is being per-
formed]. 6
3
The facts in Krenwinkel were substantially similar to Halspar, with the
material exception, however, that there was no legal requirement that
a lien claimant serve a prelien notice on a noncontracting property
owner.64 The Krenwinkel court stated that "one who stands by and
sees another improve his property, without putting him on notice [that
he does not intend to be responsible for the cost of such improvements],
must be held responsible for the value of such improvements."6  What
the Halspar court failed to recognize was that, with the pasage of sec-
tion 1193 in 1959, a corollary axiom of law should have arisen; one
who improves the property of another, without putting him on proper
notice of such improvements, cannot expect to hold such party's prop-
erty interest responsible for the cost of such improvements. What the
Halspar court did state, however, was that
[t]his result is entirely logical as the statutory presumption of sec-
tion 1183.1, subdivision (b), applies only if the owner has knowl-
ledge of the work being done and takes no action to exempt himself
from it. Thus the owner is already in possession of the type of
information otherwise provided by the prelien notice of section
1193.66
Thus, in effect, the court said that a property owner who possesses of
his own account the knowledge required to be given to him by section
1193, no longer has need of, nor a right to, such notice. Within the
limited facts of the case, then, the court felt that the defendants had
adequate information, without a notice of nonresponsibility. The court's
reasoning was that such actual knowledge would, in the absence of a
notice of nonresponsibility, bring the lien claimant under the "direct
contract" exception of section 1193(a). Yet the effect of the Halspar
decision, boiled down to a single sentence, was that actual knowledge by
the property owner of work being performed on his property at the in-
stance and request of a lessee is the equivalent of, and takes the place
of, a 15 day written prelien notice. If this is the case, then the lien
claimant, by giving the equivalent of a written prelien notice, would
have fulfilled his section 1193 duties, rather than exempted himself from
them. Why the court pursued the circuitous path it did to arrive at its
decision is not clear; but it is possible that they did not wish to directly
62. See text accompanying note 50 & note 50 supra.
63. 42 Cal. App. at 584-85, 183 P. at 959 (emphasis added).
64. Section 1193 was not enacted until 1959.
65. 42 Cal. App. at 585, 183 P. at 959.
66. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 900, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (emphasis added).
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destroy the legislative requirement that a section 1193 prelien notice be
written. Under either rationale the posting of a notice of nonresponsi-
bility would cut off the lien claimant's rights.
Although the holding in Halspar in effect destroyed the written
requirement of serving a prelien notice, 67 the decision appears to be in
harmony with the general spirit and intended result of the mechanics'
lien laws.6 The decision, however, does violence to the express language
of section 1193 and the question should be asked whether the courts
should be at liberty to circumvent procedural requirements set out by the
legislature as prerequisites to the perfection of any lien.s9
In Benson Electric Co. v. Hale Brothers Associates, Inc.,70 the sec-
ond of the three cases mentioned above, the court summarily disposed
of the same problem by quoting from Halspar.7'
In the last of the cases which presented this problem, Scott, Blake
and Wynne v. Summit Ridge Estates, Inc., 2 the factual situation was
somewhat different, 73 although the issues presented were nearly iden-
tical with those in Halspar. A novel argument was made by de-
fendants in the Scott case, however, that merits discussion here. De-
fendants urged that the reasoning in Halspar was not logical in light of
section 1193(b),74 which declared void any agreement that purported
to waive the provisions of section 1193. They argued that an owner
entering into an agreement contemplated by that subdivision would
necessarily have actual knowledge of the work being done and such
knowledge in effect would be, under the reasoning in Halspar, a waiver
of the 15 day prelien notice requirement of section 1193, despite the
67. It should be noted that under a distinguishable fact situation one court
expressly held that section 1193 contemplates a written notification, and verbal notice
by telephone was not adequate. Windsor Mills v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 272 A.C.A.
390, 77 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1969). See text accompanying note 81 & note 81 infra.
68. That is the essential purpose of California mechanics' lien laws is to
protect those who have performed labor or furnished materials. E.g., Nolte v. Smith,
189 Cal. App. 2d 140, 144, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1961).
69. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
70. 246 Cal. App. 2d 686, 55 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1966).
71. Id. at 693, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
72. 251 Cal. App. 2d 347, 59 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1967). It should be noted that
the case was decided prior to the 1967 amendment.
73. Facts indicated that plaintiffs contracted to perform surveying work with
defendant tract developer, who did not own all of the land in question at the time the
contract was entered into. There was a clear showing, however, that the noncontracting
property owners were aware of the work being performed from the outset. Id. at 351-52,
59 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
74. Section 1193, subdiv. (b) read at that time as follows: "Any agreement
made or entered into by an owner whereby the owner agrees to waive the rights or
privileges conferred upon him by this section shall be void and of no effect." Cal.
Stats. 1965, ch. 1258, § 1, at 3132.
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provision making such agreements of no effect.75 In answer the court
pointed out that the defendant had ignored the difference between
estoppel and waiver, 6 and then went on to say:
The knowledge of the owner referred to in section 1183.1, sub-
division (b), is knowledge of actual construction, not intended
construction. The basis of section 1183.1, subdivision (b), is
estoppel. Section 1193, subdivision (b), invalidates a waiver of
the right to prelien notice by agreement before construction of the
work covered by the agreement commences. Section 1183.1, sub-
division (b), estops an owner from disclaiming responsibility for
work performed on his land with his actual knowledge unless
he files a notice of nonresponsibility. 77
The above holding of the court either fails to consider the possi-
bility that a waiver agreement could be entered into at any time be-
tween the date construction commences and the final date for filing the
prelien notice, or else it makes an unfounded assumption that section
1193(b), as it then existed, contemplated only waiver agreements en-
tered into prior to the commencement of construction. The court also
fails to recognize that while it is true that section 1183.1(b) contem-
plates actual construction rather than intended construction, 8 it is also
true that the knowledge that will subject a property owner to the bur-
den of filing a notice of nonresponsibility is not only actual knowledge,
but can be constructive knowledge as wel179-that is to say, notice of cir-
cumstances that would put a prudent man upon inquiry as to the facts of
possible construction.80 It would be hard to conceive of a situation in
which an agreement entered into between a contractor and a property
owner purporting to waive the latter's rights to receive a section 1193
prelien notice, would not be such as to put a prudent property owner
on constructive notice that work was in progress, or at least put him
on a duty of inquiry to determine if work was to be performed in
75. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 354, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
76. Id. "Estoppel" is defined to mean a bar or impediment raised by the law,
which precludes a man from alleging (or from denying) a certain fact or state of facts
in consequence of his previous allegation or denial or conduct or admission. On the
other hand "waiver" is defined as the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known
right. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 648, 1751 (4th ed. 1951).
77. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 354, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
78. E.g., Arthur B. Siri, Inc. v. Bridges, 189 Cal. App. 2d 599, 11 Cal. Rptr.
322 (1961); Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Orondo Mines, 34 Cal. App. 2d 697, 94
P.2d 380 (1939).
79. Harmon Lumber Co. v. Brown, 165 Cal. 193, 197, 131 P. 368, 369 (1913);
Jay Bailey Constr. Co. v. Berry Hotel Corp., 221 Cal. App. 2d 135, 139, 34 Cal. Rptr.
272, 275 (1963).
80. Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 889, 447 P.2d 638, 645, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 405 (1968) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 19); Harmon Lumber Co. v. Brown,
165 Cal. 193, 197, 131 P. 368, 369 (1913).
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the future on his property at the instance and request of some lessee,
vendee, etc.
Whether intended or not, the line of cases beginning with Halspar
did much to do away with the effectiveness of the 15 day prelien
notice requirement. While the decisions in those cases could hardly be
called inequitable,81 neither could one say that they effectively fulfilled
the legislative intent behind section 1193. Any further consideration of
the relationship between section 1183.1(b) and section 1193, how-
ever, must be made in the light of the changes in the code discussed
above. 2  Attention, therefore, will now be given to the problem of
interpreting the effect of the code changes on those cases.
Relationship Between Haispar and the Code as Amended
As discussed above,83 the code was significantly changed in 1967.
In spirit one would think that the changes made to section 1193 would
not affect the rule of Halspar; but a closer examination reveals serious
conflicts. The rationale, as stated there, was that the "owner is al-
ready in possession of the type of information otherwise provided by the
prelien notice of section 1193. '"84 By amendment, however, section
1193 now requires, in addition to the information previously required,
a description of the property on which work is being performed, and
most important, a statement to the effect that if bills are not paid for
this work the property may be subject to a mechanics' lien.85 Thus in
order to apply Halspar under the current law, the contractor would
not only have to show that the property owner was aware of the nature
of the work being performed, by whom it was being performed,
and at whose request it was being performed, but in addition that he
knew where the work was being performed and that there was a possi-
bility that a mechanics' lien would be filed against his property if the
bills for such work were not paid. It would seem that the latter re-
quirement would, in most cases, be difficult to establish in a court of
law, unless the property owner could be shown to have had previous
experience in the field of mechanics' liens.
Knowledge Contemplated by Section 1183.1(b)
The questions presented here thus become: (1) What is the
"knowledge" contemplated by section 1183.1(b); and (2) does the
Halspar decision contemplate a stricter standard of knowledge than
81. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.
83. Id.
84. Halspar, Inc. v. La Barthe, 238 Cal. App. 2d 897, 900, 48 Cal. Rptr. 293,
294 (1965).
85. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
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normally applied to that section. The cases construing the "knowledge"
requirement of section 1183.1(b), apart from section 1193, while seem-
ing to state unequivocally that the knowledge required may be actual
or constructive,80 do not specifically state how much knowledge is re-
quired. For instance, mere knowledge that some construction is being
performed, without knowledge of who is performing it, has been held
adequate to impose the burden of filing a notice of nonresponsibilty.87
It is not clear, however, exactly what the grounds for such reasoning
are. It could well be that such knowledge merely puts one on a duty
of inquiry to determine the remainder of the information required un-
der section 1193, and the failure to pursue that duty, rather than the
knowledge actually possessed, starts the running of the 10 day period
within which one must file his notice of nonresponsibility 8
In response to the second question, Halspar definitely contemplates
actual knowledge of the facts required to be made known under section
1193.89 Whether Halspar (and Benson and Scott) would have followed
the "duty of inquiry" theory of knowledge as it has been applied by the
courts to section 1183.1(b) is unclear, for in those cases the property
owners all appeared to be in actual possession of the information re-
quired to be given by section 1193, and as will be important in the dis-
cussion below, were aware of these facts from the beginning of the work.
It would seem that the legislature intended some sort of general
scheme in respect to section 1183.1(b), and section 1193 when the
latter was passed in 1959. Both sections involve similar problems,
and appear to impose correlative duties designed to alleviate the in-
equities of the mechanics' lien laws in cases where the property is being
improved at the instance of one other than the property owner or his
agent. The most logical conclusion to be drawn out of this "scheme"
is that the "knowledge" contemplated in section 1183.1(b), is the same
"knowledge" required to be given by the contractor in section 1193, but
there is no authority on this point one way or the other.
Under the Halspar rule, once a property owner obtained the in-
formation ordinarily required to be given in a section 1193 prelien
notice and failed to file a notice of nonresponsibility, he was estopped
to deny that the work was done at his instance; and hence the contractor
fell within the "direct contract" exception in subdivision (a) of section
1193.10 Because of the serious consequences such a determination
86. See cases cited note 78 supra.
87. See Perazzi v. Doe Estate Co., 40 Cal. App. 617, 620-21, 181 P. 398, 399
(1919).
88. See, e.g., Boscus v. Bohlig, 173 Cal. 687, 690, 162 P. 100, 102 (1916);
John R. Gentle & Co. v. Britton, 158 Cal. 328, 332, 111 P. 9, 11 (1910).
89. See 238 Cal. App. 2d at 899, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
90. For discussion of this holding see text accompanying notes 54-80 supra.
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would have on a property owner, it is likely that the Halspar estoppel
argument was never intended to be applied in cases of mere constructive
knowledge. It would seem proper under Halspar that a property owner
would have a right to receive written preliminary notice, unless and
until he had actual knowledge of the information which, under normal
circumstances, he would receive in the preliminary notice. It must be
concluded, therefore, that while case law has not decided the question,
it is likely that HaIspar will be limited to those cases in which it can be
clearly shown that the property owner had actual, rather than con-
structive, knowledge of all the information (including knowledge that
his property would be subject to a lien if bills for the work are not paid)
required to be contained in the 20 day preliminary notice.
Projected Effect of Section 1193(d)
In addition to the changes in the information required to be given
in the new section 1193 preliminary notice, the amended section also
requires that notice be given within 20 days after commencement of
construction. 1 In Haispar, Benson, and Scott, decided under the old
section 1193, the property owners had knowledge of the construction
from the outset. Those cases, therefore, did not find it necessary to
deal with the situation where the property owner obtained knowledge
at some time between the date construction was commenced and the
final date for filing the prelien notice.
It would appear, by projecting the reasoning in those cases, that as
long as the property owner received actual knowledge 10 days or more
before the last date upon which the lien claimant could serve his 15
day prelien notice, and failed to post a notice of nonresponsibility, the
estoppel argument would apply and the lien claimant would be relieved
of his section 1193 duty. Conversely then, if the knowledge was re-
ceived within 9 days or less of that date, the HaIspar rule should not
apply since the property owner would not have had the statutory 10
days in which to post his notice of nonresponsibility. Hence, the lien
claimant would have forfeited his lien rights against the property owner
for failure to comply with the section 1193 notice requirement (i.e., the
HaIspar "conclusive presumption" must arise before the expiration of the
time for giving the section 1193 notice).
The next question logically is: What is the effect of the new 20
day preliminary notice requirement? There can be little doubt that
the reasoning of Halspar would still apply, in the absence of a judicial
reversal, in those cases where the property owner, at the commencement
of construction, was apprised of the information contemplated by sec-
91. Subject, however, to the provisions of subdivision (d) of CAr.. CODE Cxv.
PRoc. § 1193.
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tion 1193 and failed to post a notice of nonresponsibility. The same
reasoning should likewise apply if knowledge is obtained in the first
10 days after commencement of construction, because the period for
the property owner to post a notice of nonresponsibility would expire
with the expiration of the 20 days allowed the lien claimant to serve his
preliminary notice. Thus, in the above cases, if the property owner
failed to post a notice of nonresponsibility, he would be estopped by the
rule in Halspar from denying that he had a direct contract with the con-
tractor-lien claimant. Hence, under the "direct contract" exception in
section 1193(a), the property owner's interest would be subject to a
lien for the entire amount of the improvement.
Now, hypothetically, suppose that the property owner obtained
actual knowledge of the information required to be given under section
1193 on the fifteenth day after commencement of construction; 10 days
elapse and the owner has failed to file a notice of nonresponsibility; the
contractor-lien claimant has likewise failed to serve a 20 day preliminary
notice. While section 1193(c) requires lien claimants to serve a pre-
liminary notice within twenty days, section 1193 (d) allows such notice
to be given subsequent to the original 20 day period, but provides
that the lien is not effective for any work performed prior to the 20 days
immediately preceding the service of such notice. It could be argued
that a property owner's failure to post a notice of nonresponsibility
would be effective ab inito on a relation-back theory-that is, the
property owner could be deemed to be under "direct contract" with the
lien claimant from the original date of commencement of construction.
The wording in Halspar, however, seems to rebut such an argument:
On application of the conclusive presumption here, the contract of
plaintiff with defendants' lessee became the contract of defendants
after their admitted knowledge of the improvements and failure to
give the notice of nonresponsibility required by section 1183.1,
subdivision (b).
2
Applying this language to section 1193, as amended, would sug-
gest a "first in time" waiver theory. Under such a theory the lien
claimant would conclusively waive his lien rights to any work per-
formed prior to the 20 days immediately preceding the service of the 20
day notice.93 Application of this "first in time" waiver theory to the
above hypothetical situation indicates that the property owner's failure
to post a notice of nonresponsibility would estop him from asserting his
right to receive the 20 day preliminary notice. The lien claimant, how-
92. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 899, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (emphasis added).
93. An exception is made with respect to work performed by architects who per-
form their tasks frequently years in advance of the time construction commences.
Under section 1193(c), as amended in 1968, an architect has 20 days from date of




ever, would have a right of lien only for the work performed after the
twentieth day immediately preceding the effective date of the property
owner's failure to file his notice of nonresponsibility. That date, it
would seem, would be 10 days after actual receipt of the knowledge
otherwise required to be given to the property owner in the 20 day
preliminary notice.
Thus under the new provisions of section 1193 the points in time
of the respective failures to comply with the statutory requirements for
posting a notice of nonresponsibility on the one hand, and serving a
preliminary notice on the other, become important. If a lien claimant
never serves the property owner with a preliminary notice, section
1193(c) will operate to entirely destroy the former's lien rights (as it
would have under the provisions of the former section 1193(a)). If,
however, the property owner acquires actual knowledge of the lien claim-
ant's expenditure and thereafter fails to post a notice of nonresponsibility,
the lien claimant's lien is revived by the "direct contract" exception in
section 1193(a). However, the effect of the savings clause in section
1193(d), which permits the service of notice after the expiration of the
initial 20 day time limit, is to restrict nonetheless the amount of the re-
vived lien to that work performed after the twentieth day immediately
preceding the lien claimant's coming within the "direct contract" excep-
tion to section 1193. The "first in time" waiver theory suggested above
appears to be the only practical method of reconciling the time pro-
visions of section 1193(c) and (d) with those in section 1183.1(b), and it
is likely that the courts will adopt such a theory when faced with the
problem.
Conclusion
While HaIspar and the subsequent cases can be reconciled with the
changes made to the code in 1967, the effect of such a reconciliation is
to create new legal problems, rather than to clear up old ones. As
stated above, the HaIspar cases tend to destroy the purpose behind the
written notice requirement of section 1193, in spite of the explicit
code requirement that there be written notice. Thus Halspar, in effect,
permits a contractor to give an oral preliminary notice to the property
owner and then rely on estoppel to relieve him of the normal require-
ment of serving a 20 day preliminary notice.
In a recent California case, the court under a different factual
situation involving the giving of notice by a subcontractor, expressly
said that an oral notification by telephone would not replace the written
notice required by section 1193.11 In theory, however, it does not
94. Windsor Mills v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 272 A.C.A. 390, 77 Cal. Rptr. 300
(1969). The facts in that case show that property owners had contracted with a carpet
contracting house to supply carpet to a tract development. Plaintiffs had supplied the
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seem proper that an oral notice given by a subcontractor under a gen-
eral contractor-property owner construction contract would be of no
effect, whereas the same oral notice given by a contractor under a con-
tractor-lessee construction contract would in effect satisfy the section
1193 requirement of written preliminary notice.
The answer to the above problem, and the others presented in
attempting to reconcile HaIspar with section 1183.1(b) and section
1193, lies in making the 20 day preliminary notice an absolute con-
dition precedent to the validity of any claim of lien falling within the
bounds of subdivision (a) of section 1193. The effect of such a pro-
cedure would be to eliminate the difficulties encountered by Halspar;
bring the duties required by that section within the understanding of the
lay mind; eliminate the inequalities in the treatment of the various lien
claimants; and most important, once such a procedure was established,
it would tend to eliminate a great deal of the litigation brought under
the current section 1193. Such a rule would not in any way defeat the
purpose of section 1183.1(b) which, as stated above,9 5 is twofold:
(1) to give a property owner an opportunity to relieve himself from
possible pecuniary loss as a result of mechanics' liens being filed against
his property for work contracted at the instance and request of one other
than himself; and (2) to serve notice on such lien claimants that the
property owner will not be responsible for the work performed or ma-
terials supplied. In addition it would give a degree of independence
and finality to both section 1193 and section 1183.1(b), a status which
they definitely do not possess under the law as it currently exists.
James A. Rundel*
carpet to the carpet contracting house, which subsequently became defunct. Plaintiffs
had given an oral 20 day preliminary notice, but had failed to confirm in writing. In
addition to arguing that oral notification was the equivalent of written notification, the
appellants argued that oral notification should serve to estop the defendants from assert-
ing section 1193 as a bar to its action. The court refused that contention, and another
similar one based on a theory of unjust enrichment. Id. at 394-96.
95. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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